INTRODUCTION
On any given week a review of the The Economist or any other major newspaper reveals the challenge posed by violent conflict around the world. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2013), armed conflict and its aftermath affect nearly every Keywords: experiential learning violent conflict; political risk; corporate-level knowledge; country-specific knowledge aspect of society, including the private sector. While addressing such intractable problems is not usually part of management education, the challenge posed by violent conflict requires a greater understanding of how to manage a firm and its operations during periods of unrest-whether the unrest is in Baltimore, Maryland, in the United States or in Cairo, Egypt.
For managers who find themselves in the midst of such conflict or who wish not only to survive but potentially to gain a competitive advantage in operating in such environments, is it possible to learn to manage a seemingly "unmanageable" problem? According to Telefónica, the Spanish telecommunications firm, the answer is yes. Ms. Elena Valderrabano, Director of Corporate Identity and Sustainability at Telefónica, has said that the company's efforts to address violent conflict in countries where they operate are critically important to the firm's ability to operate and expand internationally (Valderrabano, 2015) . Scholars have found that it is possible for managers and their firms to learn from a variety of infrequent and even rare events (Lampel, Shamsie, and Shapira, 2009 ). In some cases, such experiential learning can be transferred across borders while in others there are limits on the transfer capacity of experiential learning (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Luo and Peng, 1999) .
Here, we adopt the definition that experiential learning is the acquisition of knowledge that "transpires in the organization as it performs its task" (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011: 1124) . Experiential learning is argued to be an important intangible firm-specific asset that enables the multinational corporation (MNC) to expand to and successfully compete in other countries (Buckley and Casson, 1981) . One source of tension in the literature is around the limits of experiential learning. On the one hand, companies operating abroad gain a variety of different experiences in the course of their operations, some of which are transferable to other markets. They gain knowledge of the host country, its institutions, culture, and ways of doing business (e.g., Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Perkins, 2014) . On the other hand, there may be limits on the ability of a firm to leverage experiential knowledge in other countries.
To the extent that there is a high degree of variability in the cultural and institutional environments of the countries in which the MNC has operated, prior experience may not be valuable in a new country context (Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Kostova and Roth, 2002) . In that case, not all knowledge may be transferable across countries and subsidiaries (defined here as wholly owned entities of a MNC). Local knowledge-or country-specific knowledge-may be necessary. Wide variance in governance quality across countries is likely to increase the value and complexity of country-specific knowledge.
We attempt to contribute to the literature at the nexus of international strategy and experiential learning by investigating the question: when can risk management experience be leveraged across different markets and when does that experience have to be country-specific to be valuable? To examine when and whether certain risks have country-specific characteristics that require specialized, location-specific knowledge or not, we chose to study violent conflict risk. Examples of violent conflict are war, revolution, rebellion, and terrorism. Conflicts are the ideal phenomenon for our research purposes because they are considered to have both a general cause (i.e., an enabling environment)-such as a weak institutional environment, corruption, poverty, income inequality, among others-and a particular cause or triggering event that is potentially context-and conflict-specific (Davies, 1996: 896) .
Another value in studying conflict risks is that they are often seen as issues that are "unmanageable" for business. If managers assume that it is not possible to learn from certain events or manage conflict risk effectively, no learning will take place (Lampel et al., 2009) . When firm survival and profitability are threatened, some firms will develop innovative strategies to surmount the challenges they face. Other firms will die out. Firms that adapt to new risks and challenges, though, can survive and even gain a competitive advantage.
Research on political risk, and country risk more broadly, tells us that, all else being equal, risk deters new entry and new investment by foreign firms (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Feinberg and Gupta, 2009: 381) . Given these arguably well-established findings, researchers are increasingly focused on whether and under what conditions firms can gain experience advantages from operating in countries with high levels of political risk and when such experience may be leveraged into new markets (Oetzel and Oh, 2014) . Since much of the research on political risk has focused on policy uncertainty and contract efficacy, we also seek to test the boundary conditions of existing theory by examining other types of political risks.
716
C. H. Oh and J. Oetzel into three types: armed conflicts, one-sided conflicts, and nonstate conflicts. The key difference between the three types is the role of the government. In armed conflicts, at least one of the parties involved is the host-country government. This type of conflict tends to involve territorial disputes (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011) . One-sided conflict occurs when an organized group that is either the government or a nonstate actor attacks civilians (Eck and Hultman, 2007) . A third type of conflict, nonstate conflict, is the use of armed force between two organized armed groups that do not include the state.
Unfortunately, violent conflicts are not rare events. In 2010, 363 conflicts were identified around the world with varying degrees of severity (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2010) . Research shows that conflicts like these can have substantial direct and indirect effects on foreign direct investment (FDI). For example, researchers found that a higher level of terrorism risk is related to lower levels of net FDI after controlling for other types of risk (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008) . In another study, scholars found evidence that the negative effects of terrorism risk may actually span a wide geographic area. The September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, they argued, "induced a large increase in the perception of terrorist risk in the Chicago Central Business District which includes the tallest building in the United States (the Sears Tower) and other landmark buildings which are potential targets of large-scale terrorist attacks" (Abadie and Dermisi, 2008: 451) .
Additionally, scholars are increasingly demonstrating that the immediate impact of a violent conflict may be a small part of the overall cost to a country (Abadie and Dermisi, 2008 ). Short-term financial losses may be highly concentrated among a relatively small number of firms and individuals, but cities and businesses far from the location of conflict also face significant and negative indirect effects over many years. Violent conflict also imposes added costs of doing business in a country (e.g., higher insurance premiums, security costs, finding alternative suppliers, etc.).
Given the potentially devastating effects of violent conflicts on firms, it is reasonable to ask why not simply divest in the face of this risk? The challenge is that divesting can be extremely difficult to do, even when desirable. The barriers to exiting a country can be quite high given sunk costs, immobility of assets, market commitment, and interconnectedness of supply chains, among other factors (Porter, 1976; Williamson, 1975) . Alternatively, divestment tends to be a reactionary decision rather than a strategic one and, as such, it may lead to poor and impulsive decision making (Porter, 1976) .
Furthermore, considering that violent conflicts are not always limited to narrowly defined geographic regions and the reality that violent conflicts show a nondecreasing pattern and are often unpredictable, firms are under increasing pressure to learn how to manage these risks. Prior firm experience operating during a conflict may yield important insights into the nature of risks posed by a subsequent conflict. From this perspective, firms without conflict experience are more likely to be affected adversely by conflict than MNCs with such experience. If a firm cannot or does not want to divest from a country, it is possible that MNCs with experience can protect and keep their investments (and even expand their operations) when a country experiences conflict risk.
HYPOTHESES Experiential learning
As stated earlier, experiential learning is the acquisition of knowledge that "transpires in the organization as it performs its task" (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011: 1124) . In the vast majority of studies on experiential learning, scholars use experience (which can include direct experience, vicarious or indirect experience, geographic experience, or task-specific experience, among other types) as a proxy for organizational learning (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988, among others) . This is particularly true for MNCs and their entry into and continuing operations in other countries.
A key question of interest for those concerned with international business strategy has been whether MNC subsidiary experiences in one country can be transferred through the MNC and applied in other markets (Barkema et al., 1996; Birkinshaw, 1997; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Kostova, 1999) . In some cases, general international business experience appears to yield learning effects that can be transferred across subsidiaries (Davidson, 1980; Yu, 1990) . Indeed, even in the absence of other firm-specific advantages, firm experience Once Bitten Twice Shy 717 and learning by doing can enable a foreign firm to be a strong competitor relative to local firms (Yu, 1990: 561-562) . Experience reduces firm uncertainty and increases tacit knowledge of a country's institutional environment (Buckley and Casson, 1981; Yu, 1990) . The two relevant types of experience in our study are corporate-level and country-specific experience.
Corporate-level experience
Corporate-level experience is defined here as an MNC's experience across any of its wholly owned subsidiaries. For the purpose of our study it refers specifically to experience operating in countries where specific types of violent conflicts occurred. Some firms may never gain this type of experience since they may exit or be deterred from investing or expanding in countries experiencing violent conflict (Dai, Eden, and Beamish, 2013) . Others, however, may learn from their experiences and develop capabilities around risk management; capabilities that might confer a competitive advantage over other firms. A substantial amount of research has found a negative, direct effect between various types of risks including policy uncertainty, terrorism activities, corruption, among others, and FDI or foreign-entry decisions (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1995) . Still, other studies have found that experiential knowledge obtained through operating in foreign markets also increases the likelihood that firms will continue to expand internationally. For example, researchers have found that firms can develop capabilities around managing policy risk and the policy-making process that they can leverage in other markets (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Holburn and Zelner, 2010) . In addition, the depth and breadth of firms' prior experience in one institutional environment may enable subsequent expansion into a similar host-country environment (Perkins, 2014) .
Not all experience, however, can be leveraged across borders. Researchers have found that organizational learning around major discontinuities like natural and technological disasters may not always be transferrable (Oetzel and Oh, 2014) . While experience with these high-impact disasters may enable firms to expand in the host country where the events occurred, such experience may not be leveraged for new entry into other markets (Oetzel and Oh, 2014) . Also, the learning that takes place within an organization may be idiosyncratic and/or difficult to codify and transfer (Lampel et al., 2009) .
Despite those arguments, anecdotal evidence shows that not all businesses are deterred by conflict and other major risks. In fact, even in the tourism industry, which is highly sensitive to risk, there are cases where investments continue despite the presence of violent conflict. For example, The Four Seasons Hotel had plans to construct a hotel in Beirut, Lebanon in the mid-2000s (Conlin, 2006) . When Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, was assassinated on February 14, 2005, in Beirut, triggering a period of violent conflict in the region, tourism rapidly dropped off. Despite the conflict, the Four Seasons Hotel restated its commitment to the project, continued construction plans, and its vice president for public relations, Elizabeth Pizzinato, said that, "We go into projects with a long-term view, and once we commit to them we stay with them . . . . After 9/11 we were one of the few hotel companies that did not stop any of our projects" (Conlin, 2006) . According to corporate reports on the company's website, the Four Seasons in Beirut opened in January of 2010 with 230 rooms.
In addition to anecdotal observations, scholars have found that it may be possible to develop corporate-specific advantages that enable firms to pursue new investments despite the threat of conflict or political risk. Researchers have shown that such is the case for policy uncertainty, a significant political risk for many firms (Delios and Henisz, 2003) . Studies have also demonstrated that firms may change corporate strategy based on experiential learning around risk. While MNCs often decide to internalize operations to reduce exposure to country risk, this tendency may decrease as firms gain more experience in high-risk environments (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009) .
ABN AMRO, the Dutch banking multinational, has a clearly stated system for managing risk between the corporation and its subsidiaries that involves strong central control. The Supervisory Board of ABN AMRO Bank (the corporation) is responsible for setting risk policy for the entire corporation. The managing Board of the corporation and its chief risk officers are responsible for risk policy at the subsidiary level. Periodically, the managing board assesses the activities of its subsidiaries to make certain that they are compatible with the level of risk that the corporation as a whole is willing to take (ABN AMRO Bank, 2012).
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Based on the research and examples discussed above, we argue that firms with experience operating in countries undergoing violent conflicts may be able to leverage the knowledge that they gain into other countries. This type of experiential knowledge can be generated by a local subsidiary and then subsequently diffused within the entire MNC or jointly by subsidiaries and headquarters (Birkinshaw, 1997 
Country-specific experience
Country-specific experience is defined here as MNC experience with specific types of violent conflicts in a particular host country. Although there is certainly a value to gaining general international experience, it is well established that location-specific knowledge matters in overcoming the liability of foreignness for businesses operating outside their home countries (Luo and Peng, 1999) . For example, Barkema et al. (1996) note that the longevity of foreign entries improves with prior experience in the same country or in other countries in the same cultural block. Luo and Peng (1999) found that the intensity of host-country experience is an important factor determining the performance of MNC business units. Other studies have found that firm experience operating in developed countries may not necessarily be transferrable to developing ones (Yu, 1990) . In yet another paper, the authors argued that experiential knowledge should be considered context-specific unless proven otherwise (Li and Meyer, 2009) .
Country-specific experience may generate greater value because it is familiarity with a specific market that reduces the costs of operating more than it is general international experience (Buckley and Casson, 1981) . According to Yu (1990: 563) , "a firm's knowledge about a country increases as its commitment to operations in that country and its sales there increase. This knowledge tends to encourage the firm to engage in further investment in that country." Indeed, a firm's prior experience in a host country not only encourages additional investment in that country, but it goes one step further by increasing the firm's "priority for projects in that country relative to other investment options" (Davidson, 1980: 9) .
With respect to violent conflict risk, firms that have country-specific knowledge may better understand what the state's ability is to contain violence within its borders. Furthermore, governments-despite public statements to the contrary-may actually be perpetuating rather than deescalating conflict. Firms with country-specific knowledge may be in a better position to discern the true intentions of the government and to evaluate its capacity for carrying out its policy objectives. Aside from the government's direct handling of violent conflict within its borders, firms are also concerned with the state's ability to rebuild and recover in a timely manner post conflict. This type of knowledge is highly location-specific and has an enormous bearing on the impact that a conflict may have on the business environment.
Operating in conflict-prone countries requires MNCs to strengthen their resilience against conflicts, learning not only from the conflict itself, but also from the media, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, insurance companies, and local experts, among others. Even if MNCs' facilities were not directly affected by violent conflict, it is not uncommon for firms' expatriate employees, domestic employees, suppliers, and/or supporting infrastructure to be affected by the conflict in some way. To operate in such an environment, the MNC must know how to protect its expatriates, find temporary workers, comfort affected employees, or use alternative suppliers, routes, and ports.
Colombia, for example, experienced violent power struggles going back to the 1980s, but it was reportedly not until the early 1990s that the conflicts began to affect business seriously (Rettberg, 2004) . Businesses became increasingly impacted by kidnappings, extortion, the destruction of infrastructure such as communication towers, utilities and roads, and other disruptions (Rettberg, 2004: 5) . One such company affected by violence was Indupalma, the largest palm oil company in Colombia. The firm experienced escalating security costs and business disruptions as a result of the conflict; disruptions that led to the possibility of bankruptcy for the company (Rettberg, 2004) . In 1995 with its survival in question, the company underwent a major restructuring to minimize its risk. The firm outsourced its palm oil processing to cooperatives of former workers (Rettberg, 2004) . Doing so enabled Indupalma to concentrate on its core business-exporting palm oil-while minimizing its risk exposure in its local operations (Rettberg, 2004: 10) . Like Indupalma, our data show that Dow Chemical, an American chemical company, appears to differ from its industry peers. Dow has kept (and even expanded) its operations in violence-prone countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, and Thailand. In contrast, DuPont has reduced its operations in violence-prone countries or avoided them altogether. For the reasons noted in this section, we suggest that:
Hypothesis 2: Prior corporate experience managing conflict in Country X (i.e., country-specific experience) will positively moderate the relationship between violent conflict in Country X and subsidiary investment.
Corporate-level vs. country-specific experience
Due to the country-and conflict-specific knowledge gleaned from operating in a country experiencing conflict, we also expect that the type of experience described in Hypothesis 2 will have a larger effect than prior experience with conflict in other countries (i.e., corporate-level experience in Hypothesis 1). Due to the unique characteristics of each conflict, managers in a conflict-affected country may not necessarily leverage their prior experiences in other countries facing the same type of conflict (i.e., armed conflict, one-sided, or nonstate). Every conflict differs in terms of its causes, key participants, history, breadth, and duration. The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan over control of natural resources differs dramatically in its cause, combatants, geographic characteristics, and institutional environment (among many other factors) from conflicts in other countries in Africa or elsewhere around the world (Stewart, 2002) . In this respect, managerial experience with one of these conflicts may not be fully applicable to others when the context differs.
Also, each subsidiary develops its own resources and knowledge. Some of this knowledge is not transferable to corporate headquarters or to other subsidiaries. To the extent that subsidiary embeddedness in its local environment (e.g., its business and government ties, relationship to nongovernmental organizations, key stakeholders, etc.) is critical to the absorption of new knowledge and access to vital information about the conflict and appropriate responses, contextual experience with a specific conflict will be more valuable than general knowledge on operating in conflict-affected environments.
Even when knowledge is transferable across borders, research shows that tensions, power struggles, miscommunications, and coordination problems may exist between a MNC's headquarters and its subsidiaries. Corporate-level knowledge, particularly knowledge about managing political risk, is not always shared across MNCs and their subsidiaries, nor is the process for doing so institutionalized (Kostova and Roth, 2002 ). Thus we expect that firms with country-specific experience will have an even greater advantage over firms with corporate-level experience managing conflict risk:
The moderating effect of countryspecific experience managing violent conflict will be larger than the moderating effect of corporate-level experience managing conflicts.
DATA AND MODEL
Data and sample
Our sample was taken from the 715 firms listed as part of the Fortune Global 500 (where size is measured in terms of revenue) during any year between 1999 and 2008. From this group of 715 firms, we hand-collected 625 firms' subsidiary locations from their annual reports. We included only the wholly owned subsidiaries because many firms did not report partially owned subsidiaries or ownership information for subsidiaries. Our focus on wholly owned subsidiaries has the advantage of examining those investments for which companies need to dedicate considerable resources to a foreign country-a foreign country that may face conflict risk. We exclude the purely domestic firms and nonpublic firms from our sample.
Due to missing information, the number of observations for the first-stage model (presence model) is 433,037. In the second-stage model (expansion model) we only consider host countries in which a firm has already operated. The number of observations for this model is much smaller (N = 39,060). This implies that our sample MNCs operated in an average of 10 countries between 1999 and 2008. Thus the final sample included 39,060 observations from 379 large MNCs from 29 home countries and their subsidiaries, which operated in 117 host 720 C. H. J. Oetzel countries between 1999 and . Detailed information about our sample is available upon request.
Measures and data sources
Dependent variable
To measure MNC investments in a host country at the subsidiary-level we use the number of wholly owned subsidiaries hand-collected from annual reports of each sample firm. This figure is valuable because the establishment of a wholly owned subsidiary brings substantial responsibility, commitment, and higher risks to the MNC's headquarters (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987) .
Independent variables
The first independent variable is incidents of violent conflicts. We divided violent conflicts into armed conflicts, one-sided conflicts, and nonstate conflicts. Armed conflicts are defined as contested incompatibilities that concern governments and/or territories where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. One-sided violent conflicts are defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or a formally organized group against civilians that result in at least 25 deaths in a year. Nonstate conflicts are defined as the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, that result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. All of our conflict data is from Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research. These data on conflict are some of the most widely used in the field of conflict studies (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, 2008: 466) .
Firm experience operating during violent conflict is our second independent variable. We call it corporate-level experience in violent conflict. It accounts for MNC experience with specific types of conflicts (i.e., armed conflicts, one-sided conflicts, and nonstate conflicts). We measured firm experience with each type of violent conflict by counting the total number of subsidiaries that belong to a given MNC in countries that were affected by each type of conflict in which a MNC had operated in a previous year. This is consistent with the notion that experience can be measured in terms of the "cumulative number of task performances" (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011: 1124) .
Country-specific experience with violent conflict is our third independent variable. It accounts for MNC experience with specific types of conflicts in a host country. To measure country-specific experience with each type of violent conflict we counted the number of subsidiaries in a host country that were affected by each type of conflict in the previous year. These count variables for corporate-level and country-specific experiences capture the intensity of international and host country activities (Perkins, 2014) .
Control variables
We used firm-level, country-level, and home-host country pair-level control variables known to influence MNCs' entry, expansion, or survival (e.g., Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Oh and Oetzel, 2011) . These sets of control variables likely minimized alternative explanations that other factors, particularly firm-specific ones, might affect investment outcomes. Detailed information about the data source and measurement for each control variable appears in Appendix S1.
Model
To analyze our data we used a negative binomial regression model. The probability of expanding in the country is a function of a set of firm, country, and home-host country pair characteristics discussed above. In our model, self-selection issues may pose a limitation since a firm with extensive resources is likely to be present in a host country and have higher international experience. For these reasons, we implemented Heckman's selection model (Heckman, 1979) in the negative binomial regression models (e.g., McCarthy and Casey, 2008) .
To assess the issue of exclusion restrictions, we tested several specifications for the second-stage model and the model without selection correction. Results show that this issue is unlikely to affect our results since the error terms in the first-and second-stage regressions are not highly correlated ( < 0.04) and the sample size is large. In addition, we included year, country, and industry fixed effects to control for unobserved heteroskedasticity. We also included a lagged dependent variable to reduce possible serial correlation in the residual. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable may enable us to isolate the net effects of independent variables (i.e., conflicts and experience) from their potential lingering effects. We did not include host country or home-host country pair fixed effects due to the potential of downward bias in the coefficients when used together with the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981) . We used heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors based on the Huber-White estimator with clustering by MNC and host country (e.g., Kennedy, 2003) .
FINDINGS
Summary statistics and a correlation matrix are presented in Appendix S1. We note that the correlation between armed conflict incidents and one-sided conflict incidents is very high ( = 0.868) but these two variables do not enter into the same model. The correlations between land size and population ( = 0.728) and between land size and trade openness ( = −0.733) are also high. We checked the stability of results without the land size variable and the results were about the same.
The first column of Table 1 shows results from the first-stage model. It reveals that firm-level characteristics (i.e., R&D and marketing intensities, reputation, and international diversification experience), host-country characteristics (i.e., population, land size, communication infrastructure quality, trade and FDI openness, and governance quality), and home-host country pair closeness (i.e., common border, common language, current colonial tie, and currency union) have positive and significant effects on the presence of a firm in a host country, while geographic distance has a negative and significant effect. Overall the results are consistent with the existing market entry literature.
Columns 2-11 of Table 1 present the results of the negative binomial regression model, which is the second stage of the two-stage model. In the second column we included only control variables. Many of the control variables show the expected estimates in the aforementioned literature. In the third to fifth columns, we added each type of violent conflict into a model. The results show that all three types of conflict significantly discourage managers' decisions to expand in the host country. The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics show that adding each type of conflict significantly increases the model fit. In the sixth and eighth columns, we added two conflict experience variables, that measure experience by type of violent conflict, into the model. All experience variables are statistically significant indicating that both corporate-level and country-specific experience managing conflict risks provide experiential knowledge about international operations and thus encourages managers to expand in a host country. Adding the conflict experience variables significantly improves the model fit.
The moderating effect of corporate-level experience managing violent conflict (Hypothesis 1)
In Columns 9-11 of Table 1 we added interaction variables in each of the three types of violent conflict models. The LR-test statistics show that inclusion of the interaction variables significantly improves the model fit for all three models indicating that two interaction variables should be included in the regression models. The Akaike Information Criterion indicates the same results. The interaction between one-sided conflict and corporate-level experience in managing one-sided conflict (Column 10; = 0.0003, p < 0.10) and nonstate violent conflict (Column 11; = 0.0025, p < 0.001) were statistically significant, although the first interaction was only significant at the 90% confidence interval. The statistical results support Hypothesis 1 for nonstate violent conflicts and marginally do so for one-side conflicts. The interaction variable for armed conflict was negative and statistically significant in Column 9, ( = −0.0001, p < 0.001) indicating that greater corporate experience with armed conflict actually made firms less likely to invest in countries experiencing armed conflict. The results of the control variables were about the same as those found in the noninteraction models, see Columns 6-8.
The moderating effect of country-specific experience managing violent conflict (Hypothesis 2)
The interaction between each type of violent conflict and country-specific experience in managing the violent conflict is positive and significant for all three types of violent conflict (armed conflict in Column 9, = 0.0044, p < 0.001; one-sided conflict in Column 10, = 0.0055, p < 0.01; nonstate violent conflict in Column 11, = 0.0042, p < 0.001). 
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(8) 
(8) We hypothesized that the moderating effect of country-specific experience managing violent conflict is statistically larger than the moderating effect of corporate-level experience managing conflict.
To test Hypothesis 3, we compared the coefficients of two interaction variables by using an F-test (the last row in Table 1 ). We find that Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported for armed conflict ( 2 = 130.69, p < 0.001) and one-sided conflict ( 2 = 8.16, p < 0.01) but not supported for nonstate violent conflict ( 2 = 1.30, p = n.s.). Due to the nonlinearity characteristics of our models, we checked interaction graphs using a simulation-based approach (Zelner, 2009 ). This approach enabled us to determine the economic significance of our hypothesized relationships and served as the definitive test of our hypotheses. Figures 1-3 illustrate the interaction effects of corporate-level experience and country-specific experience in violent conflict risk as a function of each of the three violent conflict risks. In each figure, the vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals through 1,000 simulations, and the thick solid line represents the changes in predicted numbers of subsidiaries when we change the value of experience from low experience (i.e., the mean minus one standard deviation; thus no experience in the conflict) to high experience (i.e., the mean plus one standard deviation).
Figure 1(a) shows that a MNC likely has more subsidiaries in a host country when it possesses corporate-level experience with armed conflict. However when a host country has many armed conflict events, a MNC tends to reduce its investments in the country. For example, the effect of an increase in corporate experience in armed conflicts changes from 0.45 at zero armed conflicts to 0.02 at eight armed conflicts, and the magnitude of change, 0.43, is economically meaningful. In contrast, Figure 1(b) shows that a MNC, which has country-specific experience in armed conflict, is more likely to expand in the country in which armed conflict more frequently occurs. The figure shows that the change in the effect of an increase in country-specific experience in armed conflicts is about 2.5 subsidiaries, changing from −0.9 at zero armed conflicts to 1.6 at eight armed conflicts. Figure 1(b) thus shows the importance of country-specific experience in armed conflict when a host country has a high level of armed-conflict risk. In addition, when a host country has more than three armed conflicts, the effect size of country-specific experience is larger than that of corporate-level experience. Thus, in regard to armed conflicts, our results support Hypotheses 2 and 3 but do not support Hypothesis 1. Figure 2 (a,b) shows corporate-level and country-specific experience with one-sided conflicts. Although the direct effect of high corporate-level experience is always positive on MNC investments, the change in the number of subsidiaries is only about 0.07, changing from 0.34 at zero conflicts to 0.27 at six conflicts (Figure 2a Thus the figure does not suggest strong economic benefits in corporate-level experience in one-sided conflicts. In regard to the country-specific experience, the change in the effect of an increase in country-specific experience in one-sided conflicts is about 1.0 subsidiary, changing from 0.1 at zero conflicts to 1.1 at six conflicts (Figure 2b ). The magnitude of the moderating effect has strong economic meaning. Also, the effect size of country-specific experience is larger than that of corporate-level experience. Therefore, similar to the case of armed conflict, our results support Hypotheses 2 and 3 for the case of one-sided conflicts but do not support Hypothesis 1. Finally, Figure 3 (a,b) indicates that both corporate-level and country-specific experience in nonstate conflict are beneficial to a MNC in dealing with foreign nonstate conflicts. The size of corporate-level and country-specific experience for nonstate conflicts is relatively small and could not provide meaningful economic implications to MNCs. For example, the change in the effect of an increase in corporate-specific experience in nonstate conflicts is about 0.2, from 0.5 at zero conflicts to 0.7 at eight conflicts (Figure 3a ) and the change in the effect of an increase in country-specific experience is about 0.06, from 0.01 at zero conflicts to 0.07 at eight conflicts (Figure 3b ). In addition, the moderating effect of country-specific experience in nonstate conflicts is not larger than that of corporate-level experience. Therefore the simulation results do not support our hypotheses for the case of nonstate conflicts.
In summary, we conclude that the moderating effects of country-specific experience are theoretically and statistically significant and provide economically meaningful implications for MNCs facing armed and one-sided conflicts. In addition, country-specific experience is more important than corporate-level experience in managing MNCs in countries with armed and one-sided conflicts. We will discuss the findings in greater detail in the Discussion section. We conducted a series of robustness checks confirming that our results are stable and statistically sound. Due to the space limitations, we discuss them in detail in Appendix S1.
DISCUSSION
Our aim was to investigate when corporate-level risk-management experience can be leveraged across borders and when the experience needs to be country-(context-) specific to be valuable. The main contribution of this article is to show that firms with country-specific experience are more likely to expand their investments in a country facing armed conflict and one-sided conflicts, even as the number of conflicts involving the host-country government increases. While corporate-level knowledge with nonstate and one-sided conflict appeared to have a positive impact on a firm's ability to expand into countries experiencing similar conflicts, the effect was not economically meaningful. Thus, in the case of one-sided or nonstate conflicts, corporate-level experience does not appear to provide learning benefits.
One reason for this finding may be that discontinuous risks-those that are episodic and difficult to anticipate-are more likely to require context-specific knowledge when managers respond to them. This is consistent with findings from emerging studies that have examined MNC response to other types of risk (Oh and Oetzel, 2011; Perkins, 2014) . On the other hand, many continuous risks, such as policy uncertainty and corruption, are more similar from country to country than discontinuous risks and are therefore more amendable to cross-country learning (Perkins, 2014) . We see this as an important contribution to both the international strategy and experiential learning literatures. As a former country head of an Asian automotive parts MNC, who spent 11 years in Southeast India, noted in an post hoc interview, 1 1 We would like to acknowledge the suggestion of one of our anonymous reviewers to conduct post-hoc interviews and the Editor's guidance on doing so.
[w]hen subsidiary managers communicated these [local political conflict] issues with headquarters, [managers at] headquarters did not consider these issues as their own issues because the home country government could not help with the local issues in a foreign country … the expatriate managers needed to solve these issues by themselves. (interview conducted on June 19, 2015) To elaborate on the significance of government involvement in an armed conflict, it is worth noting that armed conflict generally implies one of two scenarios: either the conflict has reached a point where government intervention is necessary (increased perception of instability or severity of the conflict); or, if the government is involved in a civil war or other widespread domestic conflict, the country as a whole is unstable and unsuitable for investment at that time. When the government is not in conflict with another armed group, then any violence is more likely to be treated as a security threat rather than a war or potential war that would require more specialized knowledge to manage.
Turning to country-specific experience, we found that for armed conflict and one-sided conflict, country-specific experience was positively associated with greater subsidiary-level investment. However, for nonstate conflicts, the role of experience was too small to be considered in the investment decision of MNCs, although it was statistically significant. This suggests that, since the causes and actors in nonstate conflicts may differ substantially from one conflict to another, even country-specific experience does not appear to provide learning advantages.
These findings suggest that country-specific experience confers a greater understanding of the host-country government, its role in the conflict, and its capacity to contain violence and resolve the conflict; knowledge that appears to be economically valuable (according to Figures 1b and 2b ). These insights, however, can only be gained from locationand conflict-specific experience. Moreover, although experience with some country characteristics may partly overlap with country-specific experience in violent conflict, results showed that there are experiential advantages uniquely associated with country-specific experience in violent conflict. This finding underscores the importance likely applicable to other locations. (interview conducted on June 19, 2015) Finally, our findings suggest a potential source of competitive advantage for firms. MNCs that have gained experience operating in a conflict-affected country may be less affected by violent conflicts and better able to sustain and keep their competitive position in the country. Moreover, experience with conflicts enables MNCs to take advantage of new investment opportunities when additional conflicts arise in the country. For example, the high-risk-high-return principle would suggest that in risk-prone countries, MNCs with experience can internalize their strategic assets around managing risk in a way that eventually positions them to expand over the long term. According to a former top manager at a nonprofit firm that consults with large multinational mining companies from various countries, including the U.S., on how to manage violent conflict and social risk, in his experience:
Many companies came to us too late … the leading companies know that there is a process and a cycle and that you don't want to wait until [the company] is in the conflict part of the cycle … Most wait until there is a latent or open conflict and they are in the midst of it and then they realize they don't have internal expertise and they go out to consulting or nonprofit firms [for answers]. (interview conducted on June 18, 2015)
The leading companies, he believes, gain a competitive advantage from proactively managing conflict risk. He also suggests that learning occurs not only in companies but also in communities. Companies with poor reputations may find it increasingly difficult to enter new markets as communities become more knowledgeable about which firms make the best partners.
As with all empirical research, there are limitations with our study that should be noted. While ours is a commonly used approach in large-scale econometrics studies, it inherently precludes examination of detailed firm-level processes. An important next step in the research would be to explore the internal decision-making process within organizations experiencing violent conflict to understand better why managers choose to expand their investments (or not). Probing more deeply into decision making would shed light on specific operational and strategic approaches for responding to conflict risk (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015) .
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the need to learn to manage violent conflict risk does not appear to be dissipating. Since the period of our study, citizens' revolts against corrupted and autocratic ruling governments in Libya, Egypt, and Syria and armed conflicts in the Crimean Peninsula have increased uncertainty for the private sector and for long-term business prospects in these locations. Although exit may be the only appropriate choice in some circumstances, firms that are able to develop capabilities around managing in unstable environments may not only benefit themselves but also provide jobs and some degree of economic continuity for host-country residents literally caught in the crossfire. Expertise managing these events can lead to financial success for the firm and economic survival and development for the host country in question.
